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RESPONSE
MARYLAND v. KING: PER SE UNREASONABLENESS, THE
GOLDEN RULE, AND THE FUTURE OF DNA DATABASES
David H. Kaye∗
In License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court,1 Professor Erin Murphy deftly summarizes and situates the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Maryland v. King.2 As she observes, the
case can be read narrowly or broadly.3 Murphy reads the case broadly,
suggesting that King is “a watershed moment”4 that portends “a new
Fourth Amendment in town”5 and that its “reimagination of the idea
of ‘identity’”6 “arguably invite[s] a new era of genetic identification.”7
Here, I offer a less dramatic view of the doctrinal significance of King
and the limits of the majority’s identification theory. I also offer a precept for officials seeking to expand or improve DNA databases in this
new era.
I. THE SAME OLD, SAME OLD CONFLICTED
FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
In some twenty opinions, the Supreme Court has stated that the
Fourth Amendment generally makes searches conducted without a
warrant and probable cause unreasonable per se unless they fall within
a categorical exception.8 Typically, the per-se-unreasonable-withexceptions (PSUWE) rule suffices to invalidate warrantless searches
with no further analysis of the totality of the circumstances. As shown
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Distinguished Professor of Law and Weiss Family Faculty Scholar, Pennsylvania State University School of Law. I am grateful to Kit Kinports for comments on a draft of this Response.
1 Erin Murphy, The Supreme Court, 2012 Term — Comment: License, Registration, Cheek
Swab: DNA Testing and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161 (2013).
2 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
3 Murphy, supra note 1, at 173.
4 Id. at 161.
5 Id. at 163.
6 Id. at 177.
7 Id. at 179.
8 For recent examples, see David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA
and Other Biometric Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1102–03, 1117–19 (2013). If Justice
Scalia is now part of a “nascent alliance” of four justices who “believe in the warrant requirement,” Murphy, supra note 1, at 187, he has radically altered his views. It is more likely that his
position in King stems from an affinity for bright-line rules and that, King notwithstanding, he
has yet to foresake his position that there is no “general rule” requiring warrants — only a rule
that they are required when the pre-Constitution common law required them and when “changes
in the surrounding legal rules . . . make a warrant indispensable to reasonableness where it once
was not.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

39

40

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 127:39

in Figure 1, however, there are situations in which the Court balances
individual and state interests to ascertain reasonableness.9
FIGURE 1: SITUATIONS IN WHICH BALANCING DETERMINES
FOURTH AMENDMENT REASONABLENESS

Within PSUWE
framework

To define a categorical
exception10
To apply the specialneeds exception11

Reasonableness

Parolees and
probationers12

Direct balancing

Discretionless automobile stops for brief
questioning about a
past event13
Discretionless DNA
sampling after an
arrest14

When the Court does balance interests in Fourth Amendment cases,
it almost always stays within the PSUWE framework. First, to decide
whether to recognize a new categorical exception and how to define its

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 The Figure comes from David H. Kaye, Why So Contrived? The Fourth Amendment and
DNA Databases After Maryland v. King, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming May
2014). It does not include cases on whether excessive force is used to conduct a search or seizure.
E.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (balancing to conclude that shooting a fleeing suspect
was unreasonable).
10 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11 E.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
12 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
13 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
14 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
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boundaries,15 the Court must balance.16 Second, within the PSUWE
framework, program-specific balancing occurs in the sprawling category of special-needs and administrative-search cases. The justification
for balancing within this exception is that the State has special interests beyond the acquisition of evidence for criminal prosecutions.
When evidence production is the sole objective, the balance already is
conclusively presumed to favor a warrant and probable cause (or an
applicable exception).17 When more is at stake — when, for example,
the government randomly tests all weapons-wielding drug enforcement
agents to ensure that they are not using drugs18 — this presumption is
less applicable.
The balancing in King, however, does not fit into either of these
two PSUWE categories — at least not as currently conceived. The
special-needs exception requires that the “primary purpose” of the program be something other than acquiring evidence or contraband.19 As
Murphy indicates (and every Justice realized), the primary purpose of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 A boundary-defining case that attracts Murphy’s attention is Bailey v. United States, 133 S.
Ct. 1031 (2013). Bailey concerns a per se rule for seizures of the person, which ordinarily require
probable cause but not a warrant. One exception to this per se rule permits “officers executing a
search warrant ‘to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted,’” id.
at 1037 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)), even though the detention is
“without probable cause to arrest for a crime,” id., and without “particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific danger to the officers,” id. at 1037–38.
According to Murphy, “Justices Thomas, Breyer and Alito in dissent advocated a general balancing approach.” Murphy, supra note 1, at 186. Yet the dissent agreed “that the question involves
drawing a line of demarcation granting a categorical form of detention authority.” Bailey, 133 S.
Ct. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices did not challenge the statement of
three other Justices that “the ‘general rule’ is ‘that Fourth Amendment seizures are “reasonable”
only if based on probable cause.’” Id. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)). Neither did they doubt the majority’s nearly identical observation. Id. at 1037 (majority opinion). The disagreement was over the question of how broadly to
define the categorical exception for detention incident to a search. The majority wanted a seemingly bright-line rule: the police can detain a person only within “the immediate vicinity of the
premises to be searched.” Id. at 1041. The dissent wanted the exception to extend beyond the
immediate vicinity to encompass persons “in the process of leaving the premises,” id. at 1049
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 206 (2d
Cir. 2011)), but detained “as soon as ‘reasonably practicable,’” id. at 1046. The dissent considered
the expanded category to be “based on realistic considerations” related to the underlying reasons
for having the exception and thus superior to the majority’s categorical rule of “indeterminate geography.” Id. at 1049. However, none of the opinions in Bailey evinces a movement to acrossthe-board ad hoc balancing for seizures of the person incident to the execution of a search warrant, let alone for searches of people or places.
16 See Kaye, supra note 8, at 1103; David H. Kaye, On the “Considered Analysis” of Collecting
DNA Before Conviction, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 104, 113–20 (2013); Murphy, supra note
1, at 186.
17 See Kaye, supra note 8, at 1112.
18 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
19 The Court has found searches to have been unreasonable because of this limitation on the
special-needs exception in only two cases. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81
(2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000).
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Maryland’s law was evidence production. Neither was the Court fashioning a new exception for certain kinds of biometric data.20 Instead,
the majority stepped outside the PSUWE framework, which it described as defeasible. This was not the first time the Court had done
so,21 and it did not swing the door “wide open”22 — at least not wide
open to a world in which every search will be judged for reasonableness on an ad hoc basis.23 The Court could have discarded the
PSUWE framework entirely. Instead, it maintained that King resembled some special-needs balancing cases and then included King in the
small set of cases in which it balances to ascertain reasonableness even
though the primary purpose of the search is the production of evidence
or investigative leads.24
To be sure, this set is not well defined. The majority’s elliptical description of the circumstances in which the per se rule gives way to direct balancing is reminiscent of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s theory of “family resemblances.”25 Like Wittgenstein, who deemed it unnecessary to
articulate any common denominator for a generic term like “games,”
Justice Kennedy, without articulating any essential factors, pointed to
a family of searches eligible for direct balancing. The opinion suggests
that the most recognizable family trait is that “the search involves no
discretion that could properly be limited by the ‘interpo[lation of] a
neutral magistrate between the citizen and the law enforcement officer.’”26 As with a policy that always requires inventory searches of
arrestees,27 a magistrate has nothing to decide with regard to mandatory DNA sampling. This rationale for dispensing with warrants applies in various special-needs cases, like the inventory search (even
though it is preceded by a discretionary decision to make an arrest). It
also applies to the non-PSUWE case of Illinois v. Lidster,28 in which a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
20 E.g., Kaye, supra note 8 (recommending an exception for collecting and using biometric data
under certain conditions). The State noted this possibility in its petition for certiorari, but the parties studiously ignored it after that.
21 The dissent conveniently acted as if, contrary to Figure 1, there never had been a case that
resorted to balancing to uphold a search or seizure primarily intended to produce evidence for
investigation or prosecution of a crime.
22 Murphy, supra note 1, at 184.
23 In Bailey v. United States, the case that Murphy sees as “strikingly” evincing the movement
to overturn the PSUWE framework, id. at 186, Justice Kennedy — and every other Justice —
agreed that direct balancing is not generally available. See supra note 15.
24 As shown in Figure 1, those cases are Samson, Knights, Lidster, and now King.
25 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 32 (P. M. S. Hacker &
Joachim Schulte eds., G. E. M. Anscombe trans., Wiley-Blackwell rev. 4th ed. 2009) (1953).
26 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 667 (1989)). When this condition exists, “[t]he need
for a warrant is perhaps least.” Id.
27 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) (standardized inventory procedures are
appropriate).
28 540 U.S. 419 (2004).
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highway checkpoint for solving a hit-and-run case applied to all drivers, rendering pointless a magistrate’s judgment of whether any given
driver had done anything wrong or had pertinent knowledge. But the
other two direct balancing cases, Samson and Knights, are members of
the family that do not share this feature, leaving the boundaries of the
non-PSUWE cases obscure.
Nonetheless, insofar as “a new Fourth Amendment in town”29 goes,
the fact remains that the majority chose to step outside — but not to
discard — the PSUWE framework. This is not an approach to totality
balancing that advocates of the direct recourse to reasonableness will
appreciate. It is not a declaration that “case-by-case assessments under a test as elastic as ‘reasonableness’”30 are the new normal. If I am
right that this part of King and the “tendrils”31 in other cases decided
this past Term are not quite so exceptional, it may not be necessary for
casebook writers to start over.32 The King analysis does not dethrone
the PSUWE framework or fundamentally destabilize that regime.
The case is doctrinally disappointing, I would argue, because it is a
lost opportunity to devise a candid categorical exception for certain biometric data or to revisit the “primary purpose” limitation on the special
needs exception.33 First, depending on the “scientific and statutory
safeguards” noted in King,34 a categorical exception for noninvasive
biometric data should include fingerprints and might also encompass
DNA profiles.35 Second, as an alternative to creating a categorical exception, the Court could have reconsidered whether denying specialneeds balancing to secondary-special-purpose searches is consistent
with the rationale for engaging in balancing. The rationale, one would
think, is that combining the standard law enforcement objective of ev–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
29
30
31
32

Murphy, supra note 1, at 163.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 187 (“[I]f freestanding interest balancing is the new touchstone of Fourth Amendment
inquiry, then casebooks and class discussions deserve overhaul.”). This is not to say that the questions Murphy then raises do not belong in casebooks and class discussion. Quite the contrary.
33 Another disappointing aspect of the King Court’s analysis of routine DNA collection before
conviction is the Court’s failure to consider the dominant function of arrestee DNA sampling as a
possibly weighty consideration in its own right. See Kaye, supra note 9 (explaining how this departs from a true totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry and imbues the opinion with an air of
unreality).
34 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
35 Kaye, supra note 8. Whether a particular program for collecting and using DNA from arrestees before any conviction falls within such an exception or is sustainable under a modified
special-needs balancing is a matter on which I am mildly agnostic. Much depends on the privacy
safeguards in the system and the marginal value of the information in criminal investigations.
Although I have long maintained that the value is limited, e.g., David H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 455 (2001), I am not prepared
to say that it is a complete myth. In any event, that is an empirical question of more complexity
than can be discussed here.
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idence gathering with other functions makes inapposite the presumption that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. This rationale
applies to secondary-special-purpose searches just as it does to primarypurpose ones. As such, the King Court could have dropped the problematic primary-purpose limitation and addressed the Maryland program as a special-needs case within the PSUWE framework.
II. DEFINING IDENTITY AND THE FUTURE OF DNA DATABASES
The other prong of Murphy’s penetrating paper that I would like
to discuss is the concern with the use of the word “identification.” The
majority’s undifferentiated use of the term incensed the dissent,36 and
it led Murphy to insist that “almost none of the state or federal statutory regimes authorizing DNA collection” would prevent the government
from testing DNA samples for a “violence gene” or “pedophile gene”
and then “incarcerating people based on a probabilistic predisposition
to violence or pedophilia.”37
In ordinary discourse, “identify” can have three meanings. The
first is authenticating a person’s identity via some mark or token — a
name, a password, or a biometric characteristic. Used in this manner
and to provide a permanent record of an individual’s identity, DNA is
similar to photographs, body measurements, and fingerprints. The second meaning is associating a known individual with a location, as
when a witness to a robbery picks a photograph of an individual from
a set of mugshots or when a trawl through a fingerprint database of
known prints produces a hit to a latent print from a crime scene. Both
these types of identification, which I will call authenticationidentification and association-identification, respectively, are commonplace,38 historically accepted,39 and not deeply invasive of legiti–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
36 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (excoriating the majority opinion as falling
below the level expected of a “minimally competent speaker of English”).
37 Murphy, supra note 1, at 180.
38 Professor Murphy knows “intuitively” that fingerprint databases are not routinely searched
for matches to latent prints. Murphy, supra note 1, at 163. Only they are, every day. See, e.g.,
Kaye, supra note 8, at 1099, 1131 (noting 50,000 “hits” in 2005); Kathryn Wexler, Pairing Prints
Rarely Key to Solving Crime, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 19, 1999),
http://www.sptimes.com/News/121999/news_pf/TampaBay/Pairing_prints_rarely.shtml (“Most of
the 2,500 cases a year [Florida Department of Law Enforcement] experts run through AFIS are
‘cold’ cases in which there are no leads other than the print. About 25 percent of those eventually
are matched with suspects whose prints are in the database because of arrests for unrelated
crimes.”). These fingerprint “cold hits,” like DNA hits, sometimes stretch back to crimes committed decades ago. See, e.g., State v. Watson, 827 N.W.2d 507 (Neb. 2013); Latent Hit of the Year
2012, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/news/videos/latent-hit-of-the-year-2012
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013); FBI’S Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System
(IAFIS) Helps Solve 38 Year-Old Cold Case, CHESAPEAKE EXAMINER, Spring 2011, at 14,
available at http://www.cbdiai.org/Articles/anon_sp11.pdf.
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mate privacy interests.40 Third, there is identification in the sense of
describing someone’s character, health, politics, thoughts, and so on.
Jane Doe, one could say, has been identified as a communist sympathizer, as a carrier of a disease, or as prone to violence. In contrast to
the use of a mark or token in authentication or associationidentification, this trait-identification does not necessarily rely on a set
of features that serve to distinguish one individual from all (or nearly
all) other people, and it has much more serious implications for personal privacy. As such, why would one assume that a legislator’s vote
for a computer searchable database of DNA profiles — or a Justice’s
opinion upholding the database as constitutional for authenticationidentification and association-identification — authorizes or endorses
trait-identification?
Whereas the majority opinion blurs the line between the first two
meanings of “identification,” Murphy elides all three when she asserts
that laws adopted solely to establish and fund collection of DNA from
convicted offenders (and later, arrestees) for authentication and crimescene matching reach well beyond these contemplated uses. Her argument that these laws permit testing people for “the ‘pedophile’ gene”
or “the ‘violence gene’”41 seems to be that the statutory term “identification” reaches to its farthest linguistic limits in the absence of an express limitation.42 This mode of interpretation overlooks the purpose,
intent, and original understanding of the statutes that paved the way
for DNA “identification.”43
The same unwarranted assumption infects Murphy’s analysis of
the Court’s use of the word “identification” for Fourth Amendment
purposes. In a remarkable sleight of hand, she transforms the Court’s
explicit caution about using DNA samples in ways that would be especially invasive of privacy into an approbation of many such uses.
She suggests that when “King says simply that, should police conduct
testing for ‘predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary
factors not relevant to identity, that case would present additional pri–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 The earliest case identifying the source of a latent print by perusing a collection of known
prints occurred in 1902. Kaye, supra note 8, at 1121.
40 See id. at 1134–39; David H. Kaye, The Genealogy Detectives: A Constitutional Analysis of
“Familial Searching,” 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109 (2013).
41 Murphy, supra note 1, at 180.
42 Erin Murphy, A Tale of Two Sciences, 110 MICH. L. REV. 909, 915 (2012) (book review) (reasoning that “identification purpose” could include “behavioral genetics experimentation” as long as
“nothing in the law as written . . . clearly proscribes it”).
43 The sponsors and supporters of these laws, after all, sold them as association-identification
systems analogous to fingerprint databases. To infer the intent of earlier state and federal legislatures from the outer boundaries of what five Justices, writing decades later, might have found to
be constitutional is unprecedented and unpersuasive. Cf. United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313
(1960) (“[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of
an earlier one.”).
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vacy concerns not present here,’”44 the opinion actually is giving a
green light to future genetic testing that will incarcerate people for
having the wrong genes. But this truncated sentence45 follows several
others that indicate that the Court is using “identity” and “identification” only to denote authentication-identification and associationidentification via the CODIS loci. The Court’s point was that “law enforcement officers analyze DNA for the sole purpose of generating a
unique identifying number against which future samples may be
matched.”46 Testing for behavioral traits or other phenotypes would
be “beyond identification.”47 In contrast, the balancing in King did
not include the individual interests implicated by genetic tests for mental or physical traits. It therefore seems extravagant to maintain that
by accepting the two token-of-identity uses of DNA, the Court implicitly approved of genetic testing for “family ties . . . [,] asocial behavior
or addiction, and . . . violence.”48
Nevertheless, Murphy may be making a more subtle observation
about the implications of the majority’s “identification” rationale. The
majority reasoned that DNA profiling strictly for authenticationidentification and association-identification advances important state
interests in pretrial decisionmaking and supervision of arrestees. But
why limit DNA analysis to the current, relatively innocuous loci if direct testing for putative violence genes or the like also would serve
these interests? Why not allow such direct trait-identification? “After
all, law enforcement needs to know just whom it is dealing with.”49
The answer lies in King’s balancing test. If the Court were faced
with troubling trait-identification uses, it easily could distinguish King:
“that case would present additional privacy concerns not present
here.”50 Even indulging the very dubious assumption that some of this
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44
45

Murphy, supra note 1, at 181.
The full sentence is: “If in the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an
arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy concerns not present here.” Maryland v. King, 133
S. Ct. 1958, 1979 (2013). If “for instance” applies to the entire appositive phrase that follows it,
then trait-identification that is irrelevant to pretrial decisionmaking is just one example of a case
that could result in a different outcome. Other forms of trait-identification also could constitute
unreasonable searches even though they might have some slight value in pretrial decisionmaking.
46 Id.
47 Quoting an article in the forensic science literature, the Court emphasized that the identifying numbers “are not at present revealing information beyond identification.” Id. (quoting Sara
H. Katsanis & Jennifer K. Wagner, Technical Note, Characterization of the Standard and Recommended CODIS Markers, 58 J. FORENSIC SCI. S169, S171 (2013)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The phrase “beyond identification” refers to inferences about phenotypes (observable
traits) arising from either a causal mechanism or linkage disequilibrium. See Katsanis & Wagner,
supra.
48 Murphy, supra note 1, at 180.
49 Id.
50 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added).
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trait-identification by genes would supply valid predictive data for
pretrial release decisions or for supervising prisoners, such traitidentification would implicate more robust claims of genetic privacy.
When meaningful privacy interests are on the scale, the outcome of direct balancing is not so obvious.
Thus far, I have suggested that the resort to direct balancing in
King was unnecessary and unfortunate, but, contrary to the dissenting
justices, it did not cross a line that had never been crossed before.
Although King adds to the size of the small family of direct balancing
cases, these cases remain the exceptions to the normal PSUWE framework. As for the semantics of “identification,” I have maintained that
King does not change the statutory meaning of the term, which refers
to DNA profiles as tokens of identity that distinguish one individual
from another, and that the majority’s balancing does not commit it to
upholding all manner of alleged “identification” no matter how invasive of privacy it may be.
III. BEYOND DOCTRINE AND WORDS
Being a constitutional case, King does not address the question of
whether involvement in the criminal justice system should be the triggering event. In that regard, it has been said that there is no principled distinction between taking DNA from arrestees and the rest of
us51 and that a population-wide database would obviate or mitigate
many of Murphy’s understandable concerns — disproportionate inclusion of minorities, pretextual arrests to acquire DNA, kinship trawling,
unregulated local databases, and so on.
Although universality is too costly at present and might never be
politically feasible, the idea has an immediate application — as a
thought-experiment. Those who have called for serious reflection on a
universal database tend to accept the premise that Murphy disparages
— namely, that “DNA sampling [and profiling] is [not] that big of a
deal.”52 I share this view, at least for a properly designed and administered database system (perhaps one that does not retain DNA samples).
I hope this is not a “general nonchalance about government genetic
testing,”53 but rather is the result of a more careful inquiry into the interests that DNA profiling realistically threatens.54 Still, I could be
wrong. To the extent that well informed observers can differ in their
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
51 Richard Lempert, Maryland v. King: An Unfortunate Supreme Court Decision on the Collection of DNA Samples, BROOKINGS UP FRONT (June 6, 2013, 11:38 AM), http://www
.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/06-maryland-king-supreme-court-dna-samples-lempert.
52 Murphy, supra note 1, at 175.
53 Id.
54 See Kaye, supra note 8; Kaye, supra note 40.
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risk assessments, a simple precept should guide the expansion of DNA
databases. Legislators and database administrators should do unto
others as they would to themselves. They should not adopt or operate
any DNA identification system unless they would be willing to include
their own DNA in it. It is too easy to approve of taking DNA from
arrestees (or any group) when we presume that we will not be one of
“them.”55 But if “we” truly conceive of ourselves as the recipients of
this treatment, then we are more likely to arrive at a system with sufficient safeguards. And if the benefits of such a system are substantial,
it could be foolish to foresake them.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
55 Cf. Lempert, supra note 51 (“We should judge the result in King not with Alonzo King in
mind but with ourselves, our friends and neighbors standing in his place.”).

